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Abstract 
Blockchain technologies are at the heart of digital innovation and are a harbinger of Industry 4.0. 
Consequently, popular press and academic researchers alike have focused on its importance. Yet 
blockchain technologies’ most promising efforts, cryptocurrency and smart contracts, are underpinned 
by blockchain mining. The blockchain mining service is undergoing change, cryptocurrencies like 
Ethereum and others are nearing the end of their minting. Smart contracts are in their infancy. The 
financial impetus for providing the mining service has changed. Here, we add to the literature through 
a deep financial analysis of blockchain mining regading its long-term financial viability. Our 
methods include a financial cost analysis and an anlysis of the financial viability of cryptocurrency 
through focus on Ethereum. It is found that blockchain miners, despite initial profitability, cannot 
maintain sustainable financial viability without substantial fees. This work is important to those 
academics who focus on understanding how service technologies and products underpin Industry 4.0. 
Finally, this paper contributes to the practitioners’ decision-making process to embrace blockchain 
mining as a technological entrepreneur. 
Keywords: blockchain mining, cryptocurrency, Industry 4.0, Ethereum, smart contract, technological 
entrepreneurship 
I. Introduction 
Blockchain technology is an important element of the digital economic movement. Some authors 
(Jensen et al. 2019) suggest that digitization provides a broad technology solution where blockchain 
technology plays a key role while others (Yang 2019; Nguyen et al. 2016) have provided more 
specific examples of how digitization is assisting global logistics in purchasing contracts such as long-
term loan agreements and smart contracts. Furthermor , bl ckchain is one of the technologies 
underpinning Industry 4.0 (I4.0) (Bodhke et al. 2020). For instance, Lin et al. (2018) discuss 
blockchain’s role in underpinning smart factories and smart contracts, Viriyasitavat et al. (2018) state 
that blockchain is “The application …that underpins bitcoin” and Zhao et al. (2019) have proclaimed 
that blockchain technology is the new digital technology approach for I4.0. 
I4.0 is the first industrial revolution based on not only physical technologies but also service 
technologies like blockchain (White et al .2020) and the Internet of Things (IoT) (Islam et al. 2018). 
As such, I4.0 provides new and greater opportunities for service-based products like smart contracts 
and cryptocurrencies. One of the key questions that arise in the course of the commercialization of an 
emerging technology is which product to develop (Walsh nd Linton 2011). The focus of a new 
product is on solving problems that are important to societies and on generating financial viability. In 
this paper, we concentrate on the problem-solving ability and the financial viability of blockchain 
technology-based activities as well as address and answer the questions centered on blockchain 
technologies, such as that of who considers blockchain as a “technology in search of a problem” (Bull 
2018). 
It is appropriate to ask, what problems do blockchain solve? We will discuss the problem-solving 
abilities of blockchain mining, cryptocurrencies and smart contracts. The analysis of these three 
activities is initiated by an examination of the difference between service and physical products 
(Linton and Walsh 2003) in our literature review. We also discuss the problems that each of these 
service products solve. The 21st century problems that are addressed by blockchain technologies 
include the development of stateless currency, a manner to create smart contracts (Luu et al. 2016; 
Cong and He 2019) and a pathway to validate new transactions (Gaggioli 2018). I4.0 has challenged 
the validity of the product development strategies d fined by Porter (1980); as a result, instead of 
Porter’s four business models, which firms traditionally used to commercialize emerging technologies 
like blockchain, there are many other models (Groen and Walsh 2013; Harms et al. 2015; Westerlaud 
et al. 2014) that are being used for the same purpose. All business models seek value creation, 
stability, and financial viability in a variety of ways. 
We provide a financial analysis of blockchain mining at the level of the miner. For example, Kroll et 
al. (2013) state that digital currency “Depends for its correctness and stability” on blockchain mining, 
which is centered on the mechanism used in the mining. They further investigated the economics of 
blockchain mining with the assumption that miners would behave according to the incentives. In our 
methodological effort, we focus on the long-term financial viability of blockchain mining using 
Ethereum. We also take advantage of the work of those who have analyzed the viability of 
cryptocurrencies (White et al. 2020) and smart contracts (Chang et al. 2019) to aid us in our purpose. 
We also benefit from the economic models of blockchain mining, which are often utilized by miners 
to determine what to mine, proceed by developing a mathematical model describing the economics of 
a mineable cryptocurrency and then specifically focus on the economics of Ethereum blockchain 
mining. 
Our investigation on whether blockchain mining is financially viable in the long run found serious 
indicators that this process is moving toward financi l unviability without the use of financial transfer 
fees. We find that high growth rates in the blockchain mining hash rate (which is proportional to the 
network’s total mining power), coupled with even a limited appreciation in cryptocurrency prices, 
make mining operations unprofitable in the long run. In the dynamic models of both cryptocurrency 
and the network hash rate, we find further evidence that maintaining operational profitability in the 
long run is only possible with additional investment. Finally, we also find increased investment by 
many miners in mining capability leads to increased n twork hash rate, further reducing profitability 
for miners. 
Our work is relevant to those studying blockchain commercialization and development. We utilize 
scenarios to show that blockchain mining does not develop the sustainable economic profit that is 
needed for financial viability. This is further important for the blockchain technology product base 
since if blockchain mining is not financially profitable, then the underpinning of the premise of 
cryptocurrency as a stateless currency is called into question and the promise offered by smart 
contracts is unstable. We develop a blockchain profitability model and incorporate cryptocurrencies, 
smart contracts and blockchain mining into it. 
II. Theoretical Background 
Some state that the promise of cryptocurrency as a global stateless instrument of exchange—whether 
such an instrument was ever needed—should have been dashed by the spectacular rise and fall of the 
value of bitcoin (White et al. 2020). Yet the number of cryptocurrencies continues to increase, not 
decrease. Further, we acknowledge the drawbacks of cryptocurrencies (Islam et al. 2017, 2020). 
Blockchain-based smart contract products are now also heralded as ushering in a new era in supply 
chain transparency in finance (Du et al. 2020a), banking (Dozier and Montgomery 2019) and 
healthcare (Du et al. 2020 b). Blockchain miners solve the problem of verification for all blockchain-
based final products (Li et al. 2019; Rifi et al. 2017). They are individual suppliers providing service 
products (McDermott et al. 2001; Linton and Walsh 2003) to the emerging blockchain-based industry 
(Qin et al. 2018). 
One aspect of the relation between cryptocurrencies and blockchain mining is further discussed in this
paper: the fact that buying a cryptocurrency is motivated by user intentions (Arias-Oliva 2019). There 
are a multitude of user intentions that direct the purchase of cryptocurrency including its ability to be 
“fraud-proof” (Kramps and Kleinburgh 2018), to lower the risk of identity theft (Kim and Lee 2018), 
to make you your own banker, to facilitate global settlement, to embrace a specific product (Al Shehhi 
et al. 2014) and many more. Moreover, investors obtain cryptocurrencies by buying the asset directly 
and mining the cryptocurrency. 
There are two ways to mine cryptocurrency and they ar  dependent on the cryptocurrency you mine. 
When the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, was developd, a transaction verification process was 
required. The system created to verify Bitcoin was the Proof of Work1 (PoW) system (Bentov et al. 
2014). To mine cryptocurrencies, powerful computers are utilized to solve cryptographic puzzles 
(Duong et al. 2020; Xue et al. 2018). The solution forms part of a block, which are files that act as a 
transaction ledger functioning as the cornerstone of a blockchain. As a reward for mining the block, 
                                                          
1 See https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/proof-work.asp 
 
miners receive a distribution of cryptocurrency. This incentivizes further mining investment because 
the block reward is proportional to the computational power used. 
Proof of Stake (PoS) is another verification method being utilized to overcome some of the 
shortcomings of PoW (Zhang et al. 2020; Saleh 2020). The PoS mining process was designed to 
alleviate excessive electricity use (Li et al. 2019) and increase the number of transactions that can be 
processed at the same time. PoS was first adopted by a cryptocurrency named Peercoin and Ethereum, 
the second largest cryptocurrency network, is now trying to adopt the process. In the last few years, 
many miners have coalesced into mining pools, distributing risk and reward across a large number of 
users. 
A. Cryptocurrencies, Blockchain Mining and Smart Contracts 
Given its status as an emerging asset class, academic research into cryptocurrency has generally been 
exploratory in nature. Operational frameworks have be n established for Bitcoin (Nakamoto 2009) 
and Ethereum (Wood 2014), the two most widely traded cryptocurrencies. A sweeping introductory 
survey of the cryptocurrency product’s technological paradigm has been provided by Narayanan et al. 
(2016). A critical approach towards the nascent cryptocurrency market has also been provided by 
Mukhopadhyay et al. (2016). 
Further literature has focused on novel innovations n cryptocurrency, including Primecoin (King 
2013), Spacecoin (Park et al. 2015), and somewhat ominously, Darkcoin (Duffied and Hagan 2014). 
The growth in blockchain mining has led to unforeseen demand (and consequences) for hardware and 
network providers. The Bitcoin-mining processor Goldstrike 1 was proposed to address some of the 
technical challenges that is evident in blockchain m ing cryptocurrency (Barkatullah and Hanke 
2015). In addition, legal and illegal Bitcoin solutions using non-customized hardware options have 
been discussed by Dev (2014). 
Given the recent growth in the population of different systems, intra-cryptocurrency dynamics are 
important to consider. An analysis of intra-cryptocurrency competition, documenting Bitcoin’s 
winner-take-all domination of the early cryptocurrency market, was performed by Gandal (2014). 
Arbitrage effects on blockchain mining operations, documenting how profitable miners of altcoins 
(non-Bitcoin cryptocurrencies) convert to Bitcoins to perform transactions with the real economy, was 
detailed by Hayes (2015). Dominant currencies like Bitcoin have been conceptualized as 
competitively coexisting with other cryptocurrencies n a dynamic ecosystem by Iwamara et al. 
(2014). 
Research has also examined the critical link between th  technological and financial characteristics of 
cryptocurrency. Sovbetov (2018) finds that cryptocurrency values are strongly influenced by the 
market beta, the trading volume, and volatility. Wei (2018) finds that the predictability of 
cryptocurrency returns is inversely related to market liquidity. Wang and Vergne (2017) find evidence 
that while cryptocurrencies do not behave like commodities, they remain fundamentally different 
from speculative assets. White et al. (2020) find that Bitcoin is similar to other I4.0 technology 
product paradigms that diffuse in a sigmoidal fashion (Marinakis et al. 2017a, b, c). This is not 
consistent with the adoption of a financial instrument. 
Nakamoto’s Bitcoin protocol design (2009) relies on a decentralized blockchain mining network. 
However, Eyal and Sirer (2014) propose that colluding pools of Bitcoin miners form an existential 
risk to Bitcoin, citing the possibility of manipulating the revenue structure in their favor and 
undermining the entire system. Consolidation of mining pools is a major problem; as Luu et al. (2017) 
point out, 95% of Bitcoin and 80% of Ethereum’s mining power has less than ten mining pools. If a 
pool exceeds half of the cryptocurrency hash rate, a coordinated mining attack could effectively end 
the security of the system.2 Velner et al. (2017) propose that smart contracts can effectively 
undermine the power of a mining consortium using little resources. In Lewenberg et al.’s study 
(2015), mining pools were seen as being better at coordinating miners and collecting rewards than 
individual miners. However, incentives exist for paticipations to ‘switch’ between pools to maximize 
                                                          
2 As described in Luu et. al (2017), the mining group Dwarfpool controlled over 50% of Ethereum’s total mining capacity in 
2016, but did not engage in a coordinated attack. 
their cryptocurrency rewards. Scaling mining operations in this way is likely an economically rational 
response to challenges in the mining environment.  
Developing a mining economics model requires an understanding of the dynamics between hardware 
demand and minable currency prices, the consolidation pressure faced by individual miners that result 
in their joining mining pools as well as the economic trade-off between treating the currency as both 
an investment and something directly mineable. Yet existing research into cryptocurrency is still 
nascent. Currencies possess value because enough economic agents believe it can (Kiyotaki 1989). 
The rapid growth of the cryptocurrency market makes its value self-evident, even as the existing 
framework for its economic success remains underdevloped. 
It was the introduction of blockchain technology into supply chain management that led to the 
creation of the concept of smart contracts. Smart con racts hold the promise of increasing the 
transparency of cargo flow, facilitating inspection, a d reducing fraud (Chen et al. 2017, Xu et al. 
2018, Fu and Zhu 2019). Information asymmetry betwen upstream producers and downstream 
retailers has resulted in unwieldy solutions such as just-in-time manufacturing and material 
requirements planning. Information asymmetry also increases the risk of extending credit. The 
transparency of the ledgers in blockchain technology eads to reduced information asymmetry (Fu and 
Zhu 2019). Much of the work on blockchain technology in supply chains focuses on permissioned or 
private blockchains (Caro et al. 2018, Li et al. 2018, Meng and Xian 2018, Xu et al. 2018), which 
some argue are not blockchains at all but only shared ledgers. 
III. Methods 
A. Financial Analysis 
In order to develop a model, the equipment and the capital that are necessary to start a mining 
operation have to be described; we have done this in Section 3.1. Outside of the mining operation, the 
cryptocurrency network possesses its own unique chara teristics, as described in Section 3.2, that 
force the establishment of viable assumptions (see Section 3.3). Finally, an integrated mining model is 
created (Section 3.4) that may be applied to a large number of PoW currencies. Due to its popularity, 
liquidity and ease of mining, Ethereum was selected as a case study for the application of the 
developed model. 
B.  Mining Operations 
B.1 Equipment 
The primary component of a mining operation is the mining rig. It is dependent on the on the 
algorithm used, the primary means of solving PoW or P S cryptographic puzzles. Both are typically 
central processing unit (CPU)- or graphics processing unit (GPU)-based. The components of a rig are 
globally available at similar pricing, in both high-cost countries like the U.S. or low-cost ones like
China and Russia where many miners are located. This study focuses on a GPU-based mining 
operation with an emphasis on understanding organic, long-term sustainable growth. Typical GPU 
mining equipment consists of a desktop computer with added PCI-E riser cables3. The PCI-E ports on 
the motherboard communicate with the GPU through the PCI-E riser cables. Motherboards with 
typically six (or more) PCI-E ports are used4 for mining the major GPU coins (ETH, ZEC, XMR, 
BTG). The components of the computer used in this analysis and the prices thereof are shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Mining Rig Cost Estimation Framework 
Component Description Cost 
GPU Graphics Processing Unit $      300.00 
PSU Power Supply Unit (2x) $      260.00 
CPU Central Processing Unit $        50.00 
RAM Random Access Memory $        60.00 
Case Secures Components $        20.00 
Motherboard  $      150.00 
PCI-E Cables  $        27.00 
SSD/OS Solid State Drive & Operating System $       40.00 
 Total Cost for 1 GPU $      907.00 
                                                          
3 See https://cryptomining-blog.com/tag/pci-e-riser/ for more details. 
4 This allows for as many GPUs to be added to the motherboard as there are PCI-E ports. 
 Total Cost of 6 GPUs $   2,407.00 
 
Since the mining rigs here are designed for GPU mining, cost savings are realized on other 
components of the rig. Cost-saving assumptions are een in the CPU (Intel® Celeron®), the RAM (4 
GB DDR4), and the case built from striped building studs. The operating system (ethOS) is a Linux 
operating system that was built for the purpose of GPU mining, which was selected in order to reduce 
the operational costs associated with buying a Microsoft Windows OS while allowing the typical 
miner to start and scale the operation more quickly than if they were to purchase a hard drive, install 
and modify a free Linux distribution.5 
Higher costs are incurred with the motherboard, the power supply unit (PSU) and the GPU. The price 
of the motherboard is driven by demand and the needfor six or more PCI-E ports. The price of the 
PSU (2x EVGA 750W 80 PLUS Gold G2) is driven by theneed for highly efficient energy use (80 
PLUS Gold) for the large power supply of the GPUs (160 W/GPU). The GPU selection is driven by a 
cost function that considers the maximum mining hash r te drawing the lowest amount of power 
(hash/$). For this model, we are using the AMD RX570 series. The GPU prices are driven by current 
demand due to increases in coin price (see Figure 1) and are chosen as a constant $300 for the first 
stage of the analysis. A setup with one GPU and expansion room for five additional GPUs costs above 
$900, whereas the total cost of a rig with all six GPUs is just under $2500. Higher cost savings are 
achieved using greater PCI-E ports per board, cutting he expenditure on the CPU, the RAM, the 
motherboard, the hard drive and the OS6. 
                                                          
5 Small cost savings could be obtained by the purchase of a separate solid-state hard drive and personally modifying a free 
Linux distribution. This would scale linearly for large mining operations. 
6 Due to limited availability of 12-port PCI-E motherboards, we ignored this for our analysis. 
 
Figure 1: Price Relationship between Ethereum and the AMD RX570 Graphics Card (X-axis: Date. 
Y-axis: Price in US dollars) 
We compare the price of Ethereum to the RX570 GPU7 (Fig. 1). Demand for cryptocurrency mining 
equipment causes increased demand for GPUs, raising GPU prices substantially.8 The ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions performed on this relationship suggested that a 18.57-day lag exists 
between increases in Ethereum prices and the corresp nding increases in GPU prices with determined 
by the equation: 
PriceRX570
 
= 0.2 PriceETHI+ $234.5 and a coefficient of determination of 79.6% 
C. Network Hash Rate 
Solving a cryptographic puzzle to mine a block is arandom process, where the probability for success 
of any user is determined as the fractional portion of that miner’s mining power to the total network 
mining power. Mining power is measured using several metrics that are dependent on the 
cryptographic algorithm. The most popular term for mining power and the process of mining are the 
hash and hashing, respectively.9 Miners may increase the probability of solving a puzzle by 
increasing the number of GPUs that are utilized while mining as each GPU allows the business to test 
more random hashes during a given block period. Smaller mining operations often form collective 
                                                          
7 Historical GPU data was taken from https://pcpartpicker.com/trends/price/video-card/  
8 See https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/zmemza/cryptocurrency-mining-fueling-a-gpu-shortage  
9 See Hayes (2017). 
mining pools where profits are distributed according to the hashing power each miner provides.10 By 
pooling resources, miners have a steady income to pay overhead costs, ensuring that miners do not 
need to run a full node that syncs with the blockchain as this requires greater technical knowhow.  
Miners mine blocks, a file that stores records of transaction, information about the previous blocks, 
and the solution to the mathematical puzzle that was used to ‘solve’ the block. For mining blocks, the
reward is cryptocurrency.11 The greater a miner’s individual hash rate12 r lative to the total hash rate 
of the network, the greater the likelihood of mining a block. We assume that a pool method of mining 
is used for this analysis to ensure income stability. To determine the coin generation rate, a miner 
must first determine the expected time to find a block using Equation (1). 
			
	 = 				 × 	 (1) 
As seen in Equation (1), the time taken to find a block is inversely proportional to the probability tha  
the user finds a block (the probability being defind as normalizing the user’s hash rate by the 
network hash rate). Typical cryptocurrencies have a d fined, consistent block time which determines 
how often a block on the blockchain is completed an by extension, how often a coin is distributed.13 
Once the miner has determined the expected time to find a block, the coin generation rate may be 
determined based on the coin’s block reward. The block reward is the cryptocurrency that is received 
for mining a block and is specific to each coin. The amount of coin generated each week is then 
determined by the block reward divided by the miner’s time to find a block as given by Equation 
(2)14: 
			 !		"! = #$%	&'()		*(+&	#$% (2) 
                                                          
10 Pool hosts often charge a 1% management fee. 
11 For a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, the original award of 50 coins per block was halved every 210,000 blocks (or 
roughly, every four years), ensuring a finite limit to the number of mined coins. 
12 The higher the GPU processing power, the greater the miners’ hash rate. 
13 The block time for Ethereum is set to roughly 15 seconds, whereas Bitcoin is roughly 10 minutes. See also 
https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/why-is-Ethereum-different-to-bitcoin/  
14 This analysis ignores payments for ‘uncle blocks’ in Ethereum, which result from two different miners trying to generate 
a block at the same time. One of these blocks will be accepted and added to the ‘blockchain’, the other will be rejected. 
While these are comparable to Bitcoin’s orphan blocks, Ethereum offers financial incentives for uncle block miners. 
As the blockchain’s block time and block reward are pproximately constant, the two variables that 
affect the coin generation rate are the user and the network hash rate. As additional miners join a 
particular coin network, the network hash rate increases. If any miner does not increase hashing 
capabilities in proportion to the growth in the network hash rate, the entire operation will observe a 
decrease in the coin generation rate. The relationsh p between the individual miners and network hash 
rates is an important element in this study. 
D. Organic Growth Model 
The organic growth model utilizes an initial capital nvestment of $10,000. The strategy is to purchase 
as many mining rigs as possible with the initial investment: in this case, four rigs containing 24 GPUs, 
leaving $372 for future reinvestment. Based on the initial number of GPUs purchased, the miners’ 
total hash rate can be determined as well as the amount of coin generated during the first week. 
We assume that at the end of the first week, the miner will sell all coins in hand at the time at zero 
coin exchange rate to USD. The miner will then pay the power bill, which is set at 160 W/GPU plus 
100 W/Rig. The electricity rate is set at a residential rate of 10 cents/kWh15. After paying the cost of 
electricity, the miner will invest in additional mining hardware with the remaining funds subject to the 
following two rules: 
Rule 1: The miner must fill all free PCI-E ports on the motherboard before purchasing another rig. 
Rule 2: To purchase a new rig, the miner must raise enough money to cover the costs of the 
components and one GPU. 
Our first analysis assumes no lag time due to shipping or shortage of supplies when purchasing and 
that the prices of the components are constant (as given in Table 1). Rule 2 ensures that the maximum 
amount of money the miner can have at any time is $907: the price of a rig plus GPU. 
E. Governing Equations 
                                                          
15 Data for March 2018 suggests average US electricity prices are about 10.37 cents/kWh across all sectors and 12.99 
cents/kWh for residential users. See 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_5_6_a  
Understanding the economics of an organic mining operation is essential to running one effectively. 
One distinct element of mining operations is the set of well-defined relationships that determine 
profitability. In Tables 2 and 3, we outline the lists of symbols and constants that we use to define 
these relationships: 
Table 2: List of Symbols 
Symbol Value Unit Description 




The total hash rate of the blockchain 
User HR - Hash/s The total hash rate of the busines 
t - Seconds Time 
Table 3: List of Constants 
Symbol Value Unit Description 
AvgCostGPU 2407 / 6 
$
-. 








blockchain reward for mining one block 
e−p rice 0.1/3600 
$
01 ∗ / 
The cost of electricity 
GPU HR 27  
Hash rate per GPU 
GPU Power 0.16 
$
01 







Time zero network Hash rate 
In its simplest form, the profit from the business can be quantified using the difference between 
revenue and expense. Since mining is a continuous operation, it is useful to treat profit here as a profit 
rate or profit per unit time as shown in Equation (3) in the unit of $/s. 
- 5 = "6	7 − 9:;	/ (3) 
The interest of the present study is to understand an organic growth operation where the assumption is 
that all profit is reinvested in business growth. A mining business growth can be measured by its 
ability to produce more coin on the network. To increase the mining hash rate, the purchase and 
addition of GPUs to the business is required. We substit te the rate of profit for the rate of GPU 
growth and convert the revenue and expense model into units of GPU by multiplying using the 
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The rate of revenue growth is related to the coin/time released by the blockchain multiplied by the 
fraction of network hash rate the user is contributing, multiplied by the current coin exchange rate. 
This relationship is shown in Equation (5): 
"6	7 = G$%&G$%'() ∗
HIJK
LJMNOKP
∗ .QR9: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The mining operations expense is defined here as only including the cost for power as shown in 
Equation (6): 
9:;	/ = U>  ∗ 7/ -V  (6) 
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In Equation (7), both HRuser and userPower are functions of the miner’s GPU capacity, as defined 
below in Equations (8) and (9): 
3"Y = -. ∗ 3"=> (8) 
7/ -V = -. ∗ -V => (9) 
Substituting these in Equation (7), we have a first o der ordinary dierential equation (ODE) 
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The separable ODE has the following solution: 
&=>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Thus, we have our basic equation for the growth of a mining operation. 
IV. Results and Discussion 
A. Financial Analysis 
Using historical data obtained from EtherScan.io for Ethereum (ETH), we examine the 
cryptocurrency over a fifty-two-week period after an initial $10,000 investment. Using our 
framework, we held Ethereum prices (at $400 per coin) as well as the network hash rate growth to be 
constant. Additions to the miner’s hash rate are not considered as increasing the network hash rate as 
the hash rate of the network is much greater than te hash rate of the user. In Figure 2, the results of 
the fifty-two-week mining simulation are detailed in four subplots. All subplots in Figure 2 have an 
abscissa representing time in weeks. The top left subplot in Figure 2 has an ordinate axis of coin 
(ETH) with the equivalent in USD shown on the opposing ordinate. The top right subplot of Figure 2 
displays the coin generated per week and the equivalent in USD. This plot provides insight into the 
rate at which the miner is producing Ethereum. In the lower left subplot, the “bank” shows how much 
money the miner has each week after paying expenses (being only that of power in this case). The 
change in the number of rigs, PCI-E ports and total GPUs is shown in the bottom right subplot of 
Figure 2. All markers in the subplots are indicative of two-week intervals. 
A.1 Case 1: Constant Ethereum Price, Constant Network Hash Rate 
For this base case (Fig. 2), the miner manages to produce 1.17 more Ethereum by reinvesting the 
earnings in new equipment (see “Eth Generated”) than without reinvestment. In the coin generation 
plot in Figure 2, a stair-like behavioral pattern is observed with respect to the weeks. Each time a new 
“stair” is climbed, it is implied that a new GPU has been purchased for the mining operation, thereby 
increasing the rate at which the miner is able to generate Ethereum. This purchase of a new GPU can 
be viewed in the bottom left subplot of Figure 2 in the miner’s “bank”. In this case, the bank linearly 
increases in value each week until enough money has been generated to purchase a GPU (if free PCI-
E ports exist) or a rig plus one GPU (if all PCI-E ports are full). This base case shows the initial 
purchase of one rig and then the next fifty-two weeks are spent filling the PCI-E ports of this new rig. 
In this case, the total number of GPUs are shown on the left ordinate while the free PCI-E ports and 
total rigs are shown on the right ordinate. 
 
Figure 2. Organic Growth of an Ethereum Mining Operation: Fixed Price Model 
This base case is an over-simplified version of the mining operation as it fails to consider \ changes in 
the price of Ethereum and those in the network hash r te. However, it provides the insight that with a 
$10,000 investment, even after fifty-two weeks, the miner has not made back the investment with or 
without reinvestment in the coin. Arguably, the miner has hardware that can be salvaged; this is 
ideally a net profit on investment of the pending sale of the rig components. In the coming sections, 
the model complexity will be increased to demonstrate what happens when considering additional 
changes, first in price and second in network hash r te. It is expected that for increasing or decreasing 
the price of the Ethereum, the right ordinate of each plot representing USD increases or decreases 
accordingly near the beginning of the simulation and because the Ethereum generated in the early 
months was worth more, reinvestment would become more profitable. In the next section, three price 
trends of Ethereum will be suggested based on the forecasting of historical data. 
A.2 Case 2: Dynamic Ethereum Price, Constant Network Hash Rate 
In the base model, we created at least one significa t oversimplification: holding the price of the 
Ethereum constant. The high volatility associated with cryptocurrency since 201616 has made 
variability a hallmark of the entire market and hasv tly increased the difficulty in making predictive 
assumptions on future prices. Since most pricing models use some measure of historical price growth 
and volatility data, many of the resulting models produced irrationally high values. In particular, 
Monte Carlo simulations were notably ineffective. Consequently, we settled on a reduced variance 
model (Fig. 4) to provide a more reasonable estimation range for Ethereum prices. The forecast was 
run as a Holt-Winters exponential smoothing on the historical price of Ethereum. As may be expected, 
due to the high volatility of Ethereum, the results shown in Figure 3 predicts that the price will 
gradually rise over the next year, with 90% confidence intervals bounded by zero and just above the 
peak that was observed in January 2018. 
 
Figure 3. Predictive Model Used in Forecasting Ethereum Prices 
We incorporate this revised estimation of future price growth into the next iteration of our Ethereum 
mining model. We sort our expectations into three simulations: A low forecast ETH price model, a 
mid-forecast ETH price model and a high forecast ETH price model. Predicting future price changes 
is uniquely challenging, but the broad range of estimates (i.e., heroic gains, moderate gains and 
absolute crash) incorporates most likely scenarios. We use these projections to inform a revised model 
(Fig. 4). 
                                                          
16 One-year rolling betas for Bitcoin exceeded 10.0 at times, while three-year rolling Betas exceeded 7.0. (White et al. 2018) 
Figure 4 considers the consequences of the forecast model prices depicted in Figure 3 on the 
previously discussed mining operation. The forecast v lue (moderate price gains) is shown at the top 
of Figure 4, with the lower bound confidence interval (price crash) depicted in the bottom left and the 
upper bound confidence interval (heroic price gains) shown in the bottom right. This model does not 
consider an increase in the network hash rate with respect to time. The first-year increase in the 
forecast price leads to a slightly higher coin generation rate than in Figure 4 because the Ethereum 
generated is worth $500 more than that generated in the case with the constant price. The higher price 
of Ethereum allows the business to grow more quickly as a new rig can be purchased in the thiry-sixth 
week. 
In the bottom left of Figure 4, we show the model in the lower bound of the 90% confidence interval. 
In this case, Ethereum continually decreases to a $0 price and the mining operation become 
unprofitable within the first ten weeks. The coin generation rate never increases past the first week 
because there is no money to reinvest. Lastly, we show the upper bound estimate in the bottom right 
of Figure 5. In this case, reinvestment is a clearly p ofitable strategy. The number of rigs has 
increased to twelve by the end of the first year and we are able to collectively generate over twenty 
Ethereum. The business change was measured using the following equation: 
a-.b(+$ − -.(+(($c -.(+(($ ∗ 52	V/⁄  (19) 
It was calculated to be 3.7%, 0.96% and −34% per wek for the high, expected and crash markets, 
respectively. For the price crash, measuring the change in GPU is not reflective of the loss as the 
simulation was not set up to sell equipment (this would introduce hardware salvaging uncertainty 
etc.). Therefore, the net loss was converted to number of GPUs at the purchase price. In the next 
section, we consider the historical network hash rate and integrate this into a dynamic price model. 
 
 
Figure 4. Organic Growth of an Ethereum Mining Operation: Dynamic Price Model (Forecast) 
A.3 Case 3: Dynamic Ethereum Price, Dynamic Network Hash Rate 
The previous scenario depicts an ostensible view of an organic growth business which is driven solely 
by market demand forces. The high, moderate and low-price gains returned proportional business 
growths (3.7%, 0.96, −34%). However, as demonstrated in Equation (5), the revenue is calculated as a 
fraction of the total network hash rate or the supply (of hashing) market forces. Figure 5 demonstrates 
that the network hash rate growth coincides with Ethereum price increases in this case. The promise 
of large, speculative gains for passive work lures an increasing number of miners into the market. As 
the number of miners increases, the fractional revenue for any one miner decreases (as given in 
Equation 5). Figure 5 also shows that while increases in Ethereum’s price lead to growth in the 
network hash rate, losses in price coincide with lower growth in the network hash rate. 
 
Figure 5. Normalized Network Hash Rate and Ethereum Price 
To model the change in network hash rate, the data w s smoothed by considering a 200-day moving 
average. Then, a historical weekly percent change was calculated (Fig. 6). The descriptive statistics of 
the historical network hash rate growth were found to be consistent regardless of the smoothing time, 
period of gain or specific time period considered (.g., 2016, 2017). The data in Figure 6 has a mean 
of 5.3% and a standard deviation of 2.3%. The minimum and maximum are 1.5% and 10.4%, 
respectively. This weekly percentage growth in hash r te implies that for the model business to 
maintain its profitability, it would need to add 5% (on average) to its total hash rate every week. 
This 5% growth value is prohibitively high for miners, as demonstrated in Section 4.1.2 and Figure 4. 
In the upper confidence interval of the no hash rate growth model, the business growth was only 
3.7%/week. To inform our model, two price forecasts from Figure 4 are considered (moderate gains 
and heroic gains) with two hash rate weekly growths (minimum and mean). 
 
Figure 6. Weekly Percent Change of the 200-Day Moving Average of Network Hash Rate 
The results of the four simulations are depicted in Figure 7. The columns in Figure 7 are the minimum 
hash rate growth (left) followed by the high hash rate growth (right). The rows reflect moderate price 
gains (top) and heroic price gains (bottom). The best case scenario for a miner would be the high price 
gains and low hash rate growth depicted in the bottom left of Figure 7. The business does not 
immediately go insolvent, but will eventually fail due to the inability to contend with hash rate 
growth. The most probable scenario incorporates moderate price gains and the high network hash rate 
growth, depicted in the top right of Figure 7. In this scenario, the coin generation rate deteriorates so 
substantially that the business quickly fails to cover weekly expenses. Organic mining growth is only 
profitable in the unlikely scenario of high price growth paired with low hash rate growth. In the 
colorful words of noted mining author T.A. Rickard, “An unprofitable mine is fit only for the 
sepulcher of a dead mule.” 
 
 
Figure 7. Organic Growth of an Ethereum Mining Operation: Dynamic Price Model & Dynamic Hash 
Rate 
Although this research is the first to systematically ddress the dynamics of cryptocurrency mining, 
we believe the assumptions of the model have merit. As noted previously, there is a strong positive 
correlation between the price growth of Ethereum and the growth in hardware prices. Therefore, in the 
best-case scenario depicted in Figure 7, the decline in coin generation rate would be higher as the 
large gains in Ethereum price would, in turn, increas  hardware demand, raising hardware prices. We 
also limit the scope of expenses in this analysis to only the price of power generation. Reasonable 
additional expenses include fixed costs of shelter and internet. While an initial investment of $10,000 
was made, it is fairly irrelevant as the miner will never be able to keep up with the network hash rate 
growth. Figure 8 depicts a simulation with an initial 5000 GPUs ($2M plus), $0 in the bank and the 
price of electricity at $0.01/kWh for moderate price gains and an average hash rate growth. 
 
 
Figure 8. Organic Growth of an Ethereum Mining Operation: Dynamic Price Model (Moderate Gains) 
& Dynamic Hash Rate (Average) for $2M+ Investment and Power Costs at $0.1 
This seems at odds with the practical knowledge that Ethereum mining is traditionally profitable. One 
of the model’s assumptions regards the use of earned coins: by converting them into USD as soon as 
possible, we forego the secondary benefits of recognizing capital gains on invested earnings. Since 
our focus in on the mining implications of cryptocurrency alone, we feel comfortable with this 
simplification. 
If we re-run the model again using a buy-and-hold strategy where miners recognize the appreciation 
in the value of their mined coins, the period beginning in 2015 was remarkably profitable for 
Ethereum miners (Fig. 9). 
 
Figure 9. Ex-Post Ethereum Mining Profitability Analysis 
 
In this retrospective scenario, Ethereum’s break-even price hovers slightly above $200 based on the 
mining and the appreciation of the value of its coins. Why is our retrospective simulation profitable 
for miners but our predictive simulation not so? 
First, the retrospective simulation incorporates an unprecedented growth in the value of Ethereum. If 
this value is sustainable, it’s likely that mining will continue to be sustainable. However, 
incorporating a much slower price growth diminishes profitability substantially. Second, the rapid 
growth in hash rates experienced in the last year increased the traditional costs associated with 
mining. Modern computing power simply does not mine as much Ethereum as in prior years. Third, 
the dynamics of hash rate growth and the Ethereum point to a finite life for mining profitability with 
current market dynamics. 
Forward-looking mining strategies were always initially profitable. It was only after an extended 
period (between 5 and 12 months) that mining strategies became unprofitable. This delay obfuscates 
the true long-term profitability of this strategy for many miners, making switching costs to other 
currencies more difficult. The customization of mining rigs means that the substantial hardware could 
go unutilized for other consumer purposes. Mining could be more profitable if there were a sustained 
period of stagnation (or even reduction) in the hash r te growth. However, miners have little 
incentives to switch off given the expensive infrastructure that has been invested for mining coins if 
future price gains are expected. When mining becomes unprofitable, mining rigs should gradually 
diminish and the hash rate should revert to whatever the market determines is palatable. We expect 
this to ultimately self-correct, but we lack a full nderstanding of the frictions that keep miners from 
engaging in more profitable strategies. 
B. Robustness Cases and Revised Scenarios 
Since our initial research, we have been closely monitoring and evaluating Ethereum’s price and hash 
rate dynamics. Despite changes in price and demand, we found that our initial models were consistent 
with Ethereum’s price and hash rate. During 2018, prices generally fell after attaining their apogee in 
the beginning of the year. Meanwhile, the hash rate growth did not diminish by the same margin. 
During much of 2020 (Figure 10), the hash rate returned to near-peak levels despite prices remaining 
much more consistent. 
Modeling the hash rate has several implications. Fir t, lower hash rates can potentially make mining 
more profitable as this reduces the need to supply additional hardware (GPUs) and improves the 
economics of scaling mining rigs. The hash rate changes between October 2018 and October 2020 
averaged 1.5%; coincidentally, this was approximately the weekly growth during the most recent 










Figure 10. Historical Price and Network Hash Rate of Ethereum (top) and Weekly Change in Network 
Hash Rate (%) (bottom) through October 2020 
However, following months of reduced hash rate growth, Ethereum reduced the block reward from 3 
ETH to 2 ETH in February 2019. The economic benefit of lower hash rates was overwhelmed by the 
more adverse economic outcome of a lower block reward. Modeling these new values in both the 
fixed and dynamic models, we found that in all cases, profitability was substantially reduced. In 
moderate price scenarios, mining Ethereum was so unprofitable that it never generated sufficient 
coins to purchase a second mining rig.17 
If we assume that Ethereum’s reduction of block reward never happened, we can observe a different 
dynamic. Assuming a 1.5% average hash rate growth, we find that coin generation approaches a limit 
after approximately one year, when the financial resources of the mining operation are exhausted 
(Figure 11). Prices have to be extraordinarily high and hash rates consistently low to ensure organic 
mining profitability, an untenable economic situation for most cryptocurrencies. 
                                                          
17 Due to space constraints, these models are available from the authors upon request. 
  
Figure 11. Organic Growth of an Ethereum Mining Operation: Dynamic Price Model (moderate 
gains), 1.5% Hash Rate (low) and power costs of $0.1/kW.  
We further updated our price prediction model (Figure 12) to include data for 2019 and 2020 and 
extended that forward to 2022. The October 2020 price of $385 used in our robustness models is 
slightly below the $400 assumption we made two years prior and well within our original forecast 
estimation. 
 
Figure 12: Updated Ethereum Price Prediction, November 2020–February 2022 
B.1 Transaction Costs 
During 2020, transaction costs became a much more important component of miner income than in 
prior periods,18 reaching 40% of income in August 2020. Every computation that miners perform is 
compensated with Ethereum Gas, a measure of effort that includes all data operations from smart 
contracts to initial coin offerings. Ethereum gas provides incentives for miners to utilize and work 
with Ethereum and has been the subject of some research (see Grech et al. 2018). While the focus of 
this paper is the profitability of the mining operation itself, transaction costs merit some discussion as 
well. 
The recent increases in gas prices have been attributed to widespread ‘scaling’ issues surrounding the 
Ethereum Virtual Machine.19 Decentralized finance, or DeFi, applications rapidly expanded during 
2020, providing cryptocurrency investors a series of financial instruments utilizing cryptocurrencies. 
However, the rapid increase in on-chain DeFi protocls temporarily drove up the transaction prices 
for Ethereum; these fees, in turn, substantially dropped during the month of October 20 as demand for 
DeFi products dropped. As the block reward is reduc, transaction fees become a proportionately 
greater source of revenue for miners. However, for Ethereum (or any cryptocurrency) to be ultimately 
successful, transaction fees must be as low as possible to encourage the greatest number of 
applications. Consequently, we anticipate that the current increase in transactions fees is temporal and 
that forthcoming technological protocols will ultimately reduce these fees. 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we described in detail the economics behind cryptocurrency mining in Ethereum. We 
find that despite historical precedence, current hash r te growth coupled with Ether’s price growth 
                                                          
18 See https://www.theblockcrypto.com/linked/77126/over-40-of-ethereum-mining-revenue-in-august-came-
from-fees 
19 See https://cointelegraph.com/news/ethereum-scalability-issues-exposed-as-high-gas-fees-stall-defi-boom 
20 See https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-fees-plummeted-65-in-october-as-defi-volumes-fell-back-to-
earth 
currently make it difficult to generate profitable mining operations for more than a year utilizing 
organic growth. 
Using the framework developed in this research, we created an ODE that describes the economics of 
cryptocurrency mining, adaptable to any mineable currency. This model can be used to investigate 
specific forms of cryptocurrency investment, such as miner-friendly cryptocurrency or novel forms of 
compensation for users. Our work is consistent withthe increased presence of mining pools over the 
last few years. Without organically growing a mining operation, users can join consortiums of other 
users to increase their viability and generate consistent profits. If these strategies fail due to 
unfavorable economic conditions, the risks associated with concentrated mining operations (Luu et al. 
2017) are likely to become more pertinent. 
Many limitations for the proposed model exist (such as forecast price and hash rate, limited expense 
model, etc.) and an ex-post analysis finds that mining for Ethereum has been historically profitable. 
We posit that organic growth from mining operations can be profitable, but subject to two opposing 
caveats: first, the weekly growth in the network hash rate must approach 1%; second, the appreciation 
of cryptocurrency prices must be high enough to compensate for both power consumption and capital 
investment. Based on these findings, we developed a generalized ODE that can be used to model the 
profitability of a mining operation in any GPU-based cryptocurrency. 
Future research will benefit from a deeper understanding of market frictions and behavioral analysis 
specific to cryptocurrencies. Further analysis of this ype could look at the effects of novel mining 
compensation programs and updates to this research may appear as changes to mining compensations 
take place. 
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